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Oi people,
Our TOK Blog has been referred to on another website. Even though it's for movies (referring to my journal entry on TOK and Movies, it's still something I found quite exciting. They cannot access anything so I think I am going to allow random people to view it. For those who are interested, the link is: http://www.boxxet.com/Jim_Carrey/Movies_and_TOK.15ef98.d

Is History a Science?

Just came across these opinions of a bunch (a big bunch!) of people on whether or not they consider history to be a science. Have a read and post your own opinions...
1. I believe that it is in some respects because history is the study of the past and all science isn't the study of the past but dinosaurs and ancient enviornments are. So in certain contexts science is ur history. We study the ancient indians and question why they disapeared which relates to science. I think in some way it is all intertwined but hard to take apart. I am kninda indifferent about this question because when I think of my past I don't think of science but I do so I really don't know.

2. Is history a science? I believe that the study of history is a science but that the past itself is not. To study something is to analyze; to pick apart and probe into the "why's" of things. That is what science is - Why do things work the way they do? To study the past is to analyze what people, animals and plants have done throughout their lives on this planet. Through this study, we learn through the experiences of others. The past is there, it is past, we cannot reclaim it. It just is. However, by studying the past, we create a science.

3. I think that history is a science, depending on what context you use it with. When studying dinosaurs, history is a science. The two work together. History itself is a science, because when you look at the timeline when things happend, it is a science to figure out the exact dates or the relative dating. Then again, history isn't a science because science is just that, not history. History is just facts that happened and science is trying to figure out certain facts. It's almost like Computer Science and Math. You use math in computer science, but they're not the same even though each go hand in hand.

4. History should def. be considered a science. In normal science you have to be precise. Although in some cases you can't be precise, in history the historians try their best to beprecise. In regular science, you have to gather information from research and experiments.
In history, you have to gather data and interpolate from finds. Both history and science require the same skills, if applied in slighty different fashions. Therefore, history is a kind of science.

5. I feel that history is a science because it invloved reasoning. It involves thinking about why certain people have acted upon events that they have come across. What really is science anyway, it is a reasoning course. History is a reasoning course. I am doing research work on why religions go bad, and that involved reason. It involved reason to figure out how old a dinosour is, or what it ate. That is why science and history are reasoning courses

6. I believe history is a science because science can be defined as the observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of phenomena. Also activities restricted to a class of natural phenomena which can be applied to an object of inquiry or study. History of life on earth has been a natural phenomenon and has been studied, investigated and through experience, much knowledge is gained by history. Another reason I believe history is a science because there are many theories about our history some have been discussed in depth and some have not.

7. History isn't so much of a science as how one would think of biology or chemistry but it does serve to answer questions and explain things as a science does. History can tell us what happened in the past and explain how things were as well as answer questions. SOme of the questions could be how did people live then, what they did in ordr to survive and what kind of culture they had. History can also gives us answers as to where we came from as well as other organisms.

8. Is history a science? In a way, it should be. History should be fact, it should be like a scientific discovery that proves something, but doesn't necessarily change. The truth of the matter is, history is often changing after people find out new truths, or the truth is hidden. Not everyone actually knows about history as it can often be hidden from the public. So, I suppose the way a scientist picks apart at a subject, or searches for answers, then yes, history is a science. A difficult and meticulous task that when done properlly should yield that facts.

9. History is a much debated subject, having two variables. I feel I cannot make a stong opinion leaning only one way. This is because I believe that both science and religion are needed to put together a full consensous of the earth's history.

10. I believe that science is a form of history, since it tells about the past, present, and the future. Since science is a source of past information it is then considered a history. Science is able to record events and is more thorough in some aspects on some events that happened in the past. So I personally am led to believe that science is a form of history, since it does record the past.

11. History is a science because like science, information we know and label as “facts” or the “truth” is forever changing as new discoveries, ideas and interpretations are made. Science works much the same way as history only history uses written records of human activities and science uses other means to derive information. In both history and science, the information is interpreted by the scientist or the historian and thus the information is biased, not fully truth. In history this seems to be more prevalent but if a person takes a closer look at science and its methods, the scientist must interpret data in order to give it meaning. Another example of bias in science when people of the same field refute the ideas of others and disprove them.
This seems to suggest that science and history are not all that different.

12. I do not think of history as science. Granted, digging up dinosaur bones is considered a science, and what is found in the ground is history, I don't think that all science can be considered a history. It is way too broad a topic to be placed under the category of history.
There are too many things involved in science that are not considered a history. So to make things easier, some aspects of science, like the history of life on earth, should be considered both a science and a history, but only specific parts of the subject.

13. We know that humans make mistakes, 50 years sgo people didn't think smoking was bad for you and now it's hailed as the black death. So as we evolove so does our knowledge and therefor we should not blindly follow the history that we learn from science but as a general outline that can be subjected to change.

14. [a 2nd response after classroom discussion] I agree with some of my classmates saying that history can't be a science because no experiments can be done to prove things. In my mind I can't think of any experiments that could be done. History is a type of science because it does involved reasoning but you can't mix two chemicals together to find out why someone conquored some far away lands. In chemistry of biology, experiments can be done and they can be replicated, so they can show other scientists why things happen. That's what I think a real science is, you need experiments that can be replicated for it to be a real science.

15. This is a very difficult question to answer. I think it depends on what kind of history you are talking about. History of topics such as the Revolutionary War are not types that one would normally find scientific. However, like other kinds of history, where people try and figure out the causes of things like why animals behaved the way they did, this kind has mysteries as well. While there is some evidence to why animals behaved the way they did, there is also some evidence as to why people of the past behaved the way they did. But in both situations, nobody from today was actually there, therefore not everything can be known. A lot of detective work must be done.

16. I think that history can be viewed as a science but that depends on your own defination of science. I would not consider history a science because you can not do experiments on history to prove that it really did happen. On the other hand, you research history like you research science, and there can be physical evidence supporting what happened in the past.

17. History is absolutely a science because both subject matters must coincide to create a meaningful definition for one another. Were history not a science, there would be little reason to learn about any past event because it would not have the proof we feel we need to validate that what we are learning is, indeed, fact. There are many reasons that people are able to teach the values of science and history, one of which is because they are able to support their theories by using reasoning and research to comprehend or theorize what happened in the past.

18. In regards to the question of history being considered a science I must say my opinion is that it can be considered a science. A science is the study of somthing. When history is studied then it could be considered a science. But history by itself is not a science. It is what has happened in the past.

19. It is hard to determine whether history is a science when science itself has no concrete definition. Science involves reasoning and experimentation, conclusions and descriptions, but what is it exactly? History, whose definition is as equally ambiguous as that of science, can in some cases be considered a science by the stipulations outlining the general definition of the term. Paleontolgy, for example, which focuses on the life and events millions of years ago, can be considered a science, as it involves reasoning and deduction as well as interpretation of evidence in order to further knowledge. Paleontogists run experiments and tests on their finds in order to prove theories. Theories and hypotheses are an intrinsic part of science, and experimentes must be conducted to determine the validity of those surmises. History therefore, in the case of paleontology and its related fields can be considered science.

20. In our school systems, history is considered a social science. Social sciences differ from the so-called natural sciences in their approach to certain topic. To an extent, both sciences use the scientific method to create reasons for why things occur. Social sciences deal with more subjective issues, such as culture, history, and psychology, and often rely on inductive reasoning to establish reasons. This does not make history any less a science than chemistry; it just establishes a theoretical distinction between them. Social sciences may use deductive reasoning as well, but the results do not usually occur as “proofs.”

21. History is a science in the way that it has evolutionized over time.
Also science holds a history in itself since it has been developed over the past hundred years. I would have to say that history as a science is a little abstract but science in history plays a very large roll. As soon as science came about, it revolutionized and became more and more prominent in our world. Science has become very important in almost a physical why considering all the new technological gagets we can get our hand on these days, and history still remains a very important part of our lives although it is seen in a more intangable way in how it has evolutionized from the very begining of time.

22. Technically I don’t see history as a science. When I think of the subject of history the first things that come to mind are studying how people lived in the past, what their social behaviors were like, and how society progressed to the state in which it is now. When looking at science however, I think of studying cells and organisms, how the bodies of humans and animals function, and how creatures have progressed over time physically. I have never associated one of these subjects with the other before; in fact they seemed complete opposites. That might come from growing up with them being taught separately, but I find it very hard to think of history in terms of it being a science.

23. By its very subjective nature history cannot be called a true science. Personal beliefs and thinking of the tome skew ideas and change "history". To the Romans the Celts were barbarians because well they were different and therefore backwards and wrong. Another key element of the scientific method is repetition and since history can't be repeated just like philosophy cant be proved, it is not a science.

24. I do not think that history is a science. I think it is a representation of facts and inferred opinions. These facts may have physical evidence, textual evidence, but most of the times there are holes in the evidence, and whoever is studying or trying to figure out the history will have to infer about historical objects which have no evidence or vary inconclusive evidence.

25. As a history major, I can certainly say that history is indeed a science. While not involving chemicals or formulas, the ability of putting together missing links is found in both history and science. For example, both fields of study involve placing together dates, physical evidence, and those pieces missing from the puzzle. In addition both history and science are re-writing themselves on a continual basis and often intertwine. For example, people once thought the world was flat. That notion was proven wrong by both researchers and adventurers who made the history and science books. It is important to place history and science in the same category, as eventually they will aid each other in solving the secrets of the earth and those who inhabit it.
26. It depends which type of history you are talking about. American history is not science because it is just views of what happened in the past, which is usually distorted due to the American culture trying to make American seem like the ideal by doing no wrong. However, studies like paleontology is a science. They are studying events from the past as well, but they are studying living organisms and are trying to discover where life came from. They offer new insight about past life that is not distorted by some cultural view. It is straight facts, or assumptions, about how things use to be. So therefor some history is science, but others are not. It depends on what the material being presented is and how “clean” it really is.

27. Some history is science. History concerning the order of U.S.
presidents is certainly not science. On the other hand, the historical study of dinosaurs and mastadons is science. Figuring out information from whatever little evidence is available, using the scientific method, is what scientists do. Paleontologists are scientists and historians. They sometimes have little information to work with from the fossil record, but have an ability to recreate the past using a systematic plan of attack.

28. History shares several aspects with science as a subject. Both involve understanding relationships and how to use reasoning. They also build upon the past. However, I think that history does not fall into the category of a science. Sciences look towards the future and work to discovery and development while history is an objective observation of events around us. Science is an act while History is an observation - both are equally respectable, but I think they do two different things.

29. Is history a science? I would have to say definetly. You formulate a hypothesis for an event in the past then you use problem solving and reasoning to test your hypothesis, just like the scientific method.
History isn't any less of a science than biology, chemistry, or physics. Your basically just trying to come up with an explanation for things, its just that they happened already but you don't know why they happened.

30. I think history applies to many different subjects and science is one of them. If it wasn't for history, science would not be able to look back and make conclusions based on past information. Science is what allows us to find explanations and reasons to questions about life on earth. But understanding life on earth means understanding the history of life on earth from the earliest signs of life, to the present. History is such a large topic to understand because it overlaps into so many fields of study but it is through these different fields of study that history pieces everything together.
History can be learned through various subjects unknowingly, because almost everything that exist on earth today has so sort of history whether we know it or not. Science more or less than works with history to achieve a common goal of understanding life.

31. Is history a science? I feel that soem forms of history can in turn be a science, but have been divided up seperately because of the way they are taught. Sciences should consist of subjects that contain pure facts with a specific way to prove your findings. But, in history, you may have info that is taught to you but a lot fo it there is no way to prove that is truely what happened. Also, science is universal, which everyone shares the same knowledge. On the other hand, History and its facts depend on where you live and how you are percieving it, similar to our westernized view. In conclusion, no hostory should not be taught as a science because there are some underlying details that set both apart.

32. History is a science. But, more importantly, science is part of history. Math, english, poetry, etc. are all part of history aren't they? Everything that has ever hapened in the whole world and every class subject is part of history. As for history being a science, it is. A science is, accoeding to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, an area of knowledge that is an object of study. I agree with this interpretation. We learn about history everyday whether we think about it or not. And whatever it is we speak about is something we are studying. Most everything we learn about are sciences. Everything we learn about is history.

33. I would say that yes, history is a science. Hence the name of this class, the history of life on earth.
Although it doesn't fulfill the Gen Ed requirements for a history class, it still has a lot of history in it even though it is a science class. History is basically studying the past so we know how to deal with the future. We also study science to know how to deal with the future. Therefore the two are basically the same thing.

34. I believe that part of history is science. I think that things such as the study of ancient artifacts and the study of archaeology are more science related then history. Studies like the civil war and the revolutionary war, etc. are all part of history, but things that are much older, and have to do with scientific properties should be considered science in stead of history. I basically feel that no history is not a science.

35. In my opinion, the study of history is a science. Science is defined as “The observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of phenomena”. History is the study of what has happened, or rather the investigation of, what has happened in the past. By using science, especially observation, we can use history to learn from past mistakes of older cultures, or better understand our own lives. Therefore the study of history is a science because by using scientific procedures, it can be used to better society as a whole.

36. History is Science. Many things are science. If we expand upon the category of science we can encorporate pretty much whatever we want to be called science. However, history is the science of our life. By this I mean the actions and progression are notable marked in society. Similarly to science, history keeps a diary of evolution.

37. I beleive that History and Science are very closely related. Both require extensive resaerch and knowledge and both feilds of study are continually braodening. Often times one is needed to understand the other. For instance, there is such a thing as the history of science.
We all learn about such historical figures as Darwin and Newton in order to better understand their theories. In addition, scientific study can help to determine factors such as, what a particular climate was like at a given time. This can be helpful when trying to understand how a group of people or animals might have lived. In fact Science and History are so closely related that the two feilds sometimes merge to form one area of study, such as paleontology or anthropology.

38. History should be classified as a science. Science is described as knowledge of principles and causes; ascertained truth of facts. When historians look at past events, they decipher what is fact and what is fiction. Also, what caused the incident to occur and how, if necessary, it can be avoided in the future. Scientists, in the more traditional conception, do the exact same thing. They observe, record, study, and conclude, though their topics might be more abstract and complicated. History can be viewed as more of a social science and biology, chemistry, and physics are looked upon as more physical sciences. In the end however, all sciences are researched in the same matter and are just as important in our understanding of the world.

39. I don' think history is a science. Science in itself can be included as a part of history, for its ability to create records and re-create scenes from the past, but history itself does not go by a certain established set of rules and theories that dictate the outcomes within it. The history of dinosaurs, plants, animals, and humans for example are explained by science, but i think history, in the context of what is taught in schools was created deliberatley seperate from science in order to add more cultural distinction and create a more humanistic quality for people to specifically relate rather than have everything presented in such a cut and dry way. History stilll creates many questions about societies, and much of the dependence and reverence of history creates the nationalism and ethnocentrism that cause the problems in the world today.

40. I do think history is a science. When trying to figure out how old something is or what it was, you follow the same set of steps every time, just like science. When you discover something old, it's like discovering something new again. You know nothing about it, so you have to learn all you can about it using the information you have.

41. History and science share many similar charactaristics. They both follow the same chronological path and they both have uncertainties.
It think though that it is a far cry to call history a science.
History is based on human opinions and perspectives on particular unrepeatable events. It is said that the victors write the history books. Events happen because of the qualities and conflicts of humans which is the very reason that it is unreliable. It is based in opinion and perspective and not pure fact. The only way to prove a scientific theory is to be able to repeat an experiment. Science must prove the existance of certain phenomena whereas history is full of phenomena that undeniably happened. The two are therefore comprable but not interchangeable.

42. In some terms history is a sience. For example, a paleontologist is not only a scientist but also a historian. They study the anatomy of dinosaurs but also uncover the history of dinosaurs. But, if you look at science in terms of physics, or chemistry history is not a science.
There are many definitions of science. One is: "Accumulated and established knowledge, which has been systematized and formulated with reference to the discovery of general truths or the operation of general laws; knowledge classified and made available in work, life, or the search for truth; comprehensive, profound, or philosophical knowledge." This definition fits in with history being sort of science. And then there is the more scientifical definition of science: "Such activities restricted to a class of natural phenomena." It all depends on how you define science.

43. The question “Is history a science?” is kind of a broad topic, and is a bit hard to answer because of this. I believe that to answer this question it must be made more specific what kind of history is being talked about. I think that if it is history of the earth, plants and animals, evolution, and all things like that, then yes, history is a science. However, on the other hand, if the history is history of countries, cultures, wars, and all things like this, then I don’t really think that history is a science. This may be because I have come to think of “science” as having to do with the physical world, and since the history of countries and cultures and so forth is not so much about the physical world, I don’t think of it as a science.

44. While I think that science is part of our history I don't belive that history is part of science. When I think of science I think of quantitative and qualitative analysis. But, when I think of history, I think of the past and reasoning/philosophy. I don't believe that history is a science. I think that there are things that are scientifically historical (such as the discovery of the double helix) however I don't think that the history of WWII is scientific.
Basically, what I'm trying to say is that there are things, such as dinosaurs that are both history and science, however I don't think that history, itself, is a science.

45. I believe that if you use the term science loosley than even teaching the english language could be a science. There is a science to everything, so why not history? I understand that history is an integral part of history, and it is part of the humanities, but it could very well be a science. To be honest though, I feel that to classify history as a "science" would be to confusing for most.

46. I see science as more a study of why things happen while history is more a study of things that have happened. There are however social elements of life that could be considered as science such as politics.
Studying politics gives one an explanation of events that may take place in a governmental arena just as studying chemistry looks at reactions in a chemical environemnt. This however is the exception, because history is a survey not a science.

47. In a theoretical sense, yes history is a science because it fits all of the qualifications. History however does not fulfill the one aspect of having to form hypothesis to make it a science. Science includes makeing hypothesies and conducting experiments, history does not include

48. History is definatley a science. The idea of discoverying history is closley related to science. As we have discussed in this class paleantologist use basic reasoning to figure oit adn reconstruct the past. that is the basis of science. Also , just as in science, hypothosis's are always formed. Until that have been proven many times in many different ways they do not become facts. Each dig is like an experiment. History is a science undeniably.

49. I personally dont believe that history should be regarded as a science. I am not discrediting history a legitimate field of study, but I believe that natural sciences and social sciences are clearly distinct. Natural sciences (or plainly 'science') use the scientific method, experimentation, and re-experimentation to reach conclusions.
History uses different methods. History, although an objective approach, cannot find answers that are absolutely independent of the human condition, which is the goal of science. Amino acids make up proteins, there's no disputing that, that is law no matter what humans say, for example. However, history is merely a study of human thought.

50. No I do not believe that history is a science. A science is something that can be proven by a series of experiments. History however is a group of events that have been important to society and the natural world. There are aspects of history that science can attribute to and help to understand. Paeleontology are archeology are two fields that are incorporated into both history and science. They coorespond to each other, to balance and clarify issues and ideas. I do not think history is a science, but it does need to it to exsist fully.

51. Science is defined in the dictionary as an "area of knowledge that is object of study." So, in that case, yes, history is a science. It is not science in the fact that it does not follow the Scientific Method.Many theories are made and studied, but most of the time experiments can't be done on them to prove them right or wrong.Butit is stilla social science, which is a science dealing with a particular aspect of human society.History studies are often used to learn more about people and cultures and to compare different people, etc. I think it can be considered a science.

52. Science is a discipline that involves forming hypotheses and testing them by making observations and collecting data. Science attempts to give logical explanations for occurrences in nature; it looks for the causes behind the effects that humans can easily observe. History also studies cause and effect, but beyond that, the two fields are dissimilar. History outlines and interprets known facts in a subjective manner. History often attempts to explain the causes of war and the motivations of leaders, but historians can only draw upon the past. They cannot consistently predict what will happen in the future, nor can they set up controlled experiments to test their ideas.

53. History is a science because it's a study of something. Scientific things that have happenned are in the past so does that mean they are no longer scientific. Events that happen millions of years ago are both a science and a history, with both ideas behind it, the area will be studied better. That's like saying the big bang theory needs to be studied by historians, not by scientists because it happenned in the past.

54. A vast majority of the history field is discovered by science, so I don’t see how it couldn’t be considered a science. The name of our science course is even the HISTORY of life on Earth. We determine the life styles of ancestors and events in ancient times through artifacts and by using other scientific means. Archaeologists must have a balance of knowledge between science and history in order to accurately assume what happened in the olden days when records were not kept. The only way they can come to logical conclusions is by using the science of history.

55. I am not really sure that this is a black or white issue for me. In Merriam Webster dictionary, science is defined as:The state of knowing: knowledge as distinguished from ignorance or misunderstanding
According to Websters, history is defined as: a chronological record of significant events (as affecting a nation or institution) often including an explanation of their causes. History is completely biased. Attitude change depending on the culture one lives in. So I think that science is not a history if a person accepts the Merriam Websters definition. If science is supposed to be an unbiased "state of knowing," then it cannot qualify as history

56. History is a science because we can learn from the past histories of various cultures and creatures and prepare for the future with by using what we discover. History helps to determine a year or give a time to an event and this makes it alot easier to understand information over the different time periods.By utilizing history we can better understand why certain thigns occurred and hopefully prevent similar happenings in the future. We can learn from mistakes or tragedies of one soceity and grow stronger as a nation and a species too. One example of history that we are trying to avoid or do not want repeated is the extinction of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago, we use history to expand our knowledge and to better recognize the past's efforts too.

57. History is without a doubt a science. The ability to discern what has happened in the past requires the us of numerous techniques and relentless questioning. The ability to find out exactly what happened in the past requires a scientist to be a type of detective, only the clues are more than a few days old. Science is the process of understanding something out of ignorance. Therefor history must be a science. We are learning more information about the past that we were previoulsy ignorant to. The ability to examine evidence and correlate facts to create a theory about what happened in the past may perhaps be one of the most difficult processes in science. Many facts are not absolute. They may be based on similarities to what we know today, but we may never for certain know what happened in the past without a firsthand account of the events.

58. I believe that history is a science. Science is defined in Webster's Dictionary as the observation, identification, description, experimental investigation, and theoretical explanation of natural phenomena. You can define history in a similar way if you think about it. Both of these fields rely on people to believe something occurred or occurs that they cannot see with there own eyes. How do we know that the Egyptians built the pyramids no one living was there and in the same way how do we know that radio waves exist? These are both true because we can see the pyramids today and hear radio waves on a radio. People had to research and find basis for both of these things before they were accepted for fact. Another way these two are connected is they are fields of study that are constantly getting new information that in turn may change how a certain aspect that has been accepted for a long time will now be obsolete. They are very similar in the ways that they explain what happens. Historians and Scientists study, research, and are always looking for new facts to prove what they think.

59. To consider history a science, one must consider the definition of science itself. If science is considered 'the state of knowing' or 'a department of sytematized knowledge as an object of study' (as it is defined in Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary), then history could indeed be considered as such. Many scholars systematically study the events of the past -- looking at such areas as technology, society, and culture -- and through this lens, history can be seen as scientific. However, the interpretation of history, by the nature of its subjectiveness, cannot and should not be seen as scientific.

60. I believe that certain aspects of history can be labeled as a science. Many things that have happened in history like in science are not always the truth. We take something that might be bold, groundbreaking, and divine and we strain it through our prejudices leaving only a skewed narrow sliver of what is. That is the nature of truth, it does not stand up to the tests of science, because truth has personality. They be truthful, in that we have no other way to explain what happened, but it may not be the facts. That is simply because history is history and once it happens we cannot get it back. Figuring out what happened in our past is undoubtly a science in itself.

61. I do not believe that history is considered a science.
History, to me, is the study of the past while science looks at problems of the present and tries to create solutions. I do, however, think it is important for History and Science to work together.
Many things in our history can help scientists today by giving them a base knowledge for how everything started. Both science and history are very important, and while we can learn from the mistakes of the past (history), scienists can look at those mistakes and find the best way to prevent them from happening in the future.

62. Webster’s Dictionary defines science as, “Systematized knowledge derived from observation, study, and experimentation carried on in order to determine the nature or principles of what is being studied.” Thus, someone who gains an understanding of the current state of the world, environmentally, politically, or economically, though observation is classified as a scientist. Then the study of the history of life must, in essence, be a science. Scientists in this field are observing, studying, and experimenting on evidence of the history of life and making deductions regarding evolutionary adaptations, climate change, and species preservation. This satisfies the criteria implied in the definition of science; therefore, the study of the history of life must be considered a science.

63. I think history is a kind of science, because within the word science, holds many unanswered questions. Science can be reffering to Biology, chemistry, some mathematics, even politics. There is a whele social science requirement at this school which is like a "people science".
Through science, we begin to understand why people in history may have done the things that they did. Scientific support for historical events makes history come alive.

64. No, history is not a science. Science is defined by its experiments, and the ability to duplicate the results of these experiments. History is not an experiment. History is the past: a record of what has happened. Although history is said to "repeat itself," these replications are of general concepts, and are coincidental. History is not precise and controlled enough to fit into the science category.

65. I do believe that history is a science. In order to find out important infomation about ancient artifacts you must use scientific techniques to find out the accurate age of the artifact. Also, scientific testing would be used on soil samples to see where the artifactcame from.
If you did not use science in trying to find out important information then your research would be inaccurate.

66. Is science a history? Science has numerous definitions. It depends on what definition one will look at when determining the answer to this question. If one looks at the definition that "science is the observation, identification, and experimental investigation, of a phenomena",I would say that no, science is not a history.One is not observing it or doing any type of experimental investigation they are simply learning from the past and what already happened usually through an already printed medium. If one uses the definition that “science is an activity that appears to require study and method such as the science of purchasing” I would say that science is a history. One will need to study the methods that were used in the past and that worked when purchasing something. It depends on how one defines science as to whether is it considered a history or not.

Do I think history is a science? Well, science AND history ask what happened and why? Science uses discoveries made in the past to discover things for the future. History unfolds the discoveries of the past. The true answer really lies in how we define "science." If it is considered to be the question, the investigation and the observation then yes, history is a science. If science is an unbiased answer to a question, then no, history is not a science. In writing the essay on the different contexts in which scientists, mathematicians and historians use the word "explain" we have seen that they are in all senses different as the meaning of the word "explain" itself is different. The debate is still firing on amongst the greatest of scientists and historians but as of now, history is a subject classified as a social SCIENCE. It is in the end, up to every individual to decide for his own because there is no ONE UNIVERSAL TRUTH when it comes to such issues.

PI

If you thought the 216 digit number in Pie was impressive, check this out!

Japanese breaks pi memory record (Saturday, 2nd July, 2005- BBC UK)

The symbol used for pi is a letter from the Greek alphabet

A Japanese mental health counsellor has broken the world record for reciting pi, the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter, from memory.

Akira Haraguchi, 59, managed to recite the number's first 83,431 decimal places, almost

doubling the previous record held by another Japanese.

He had to stop three hours into his recital after losing his place, and had to start from the beginning.

Pi is an infinite decimal whose numbers never repeat in a pattern.

Mr Haraguchi, from Chiba, east of Tokyo, took several hours reciting the numbers, finishing in the early hours of Saturday.

"I thank you all for your support," he told reporters and onlookers at the public hall in Tokyo.

He hopes to be listed in the Guinness Book of World Records to replace his fellow countryman Hiroyuki Goto, who managed to recite 42,195 numbers as a 21-year-old student in 1995.

Mr Haraguchi had already recited the ratio up to about 54,000 digits last September, but was forced to drop the challenge when the facility hosting the event closed for the night.

So far, pi has been calculated to 1.24 trillion decimal places with the aid of a supercomputer.

Conventionally, 3.14159 is used as pi.

Pi is known for turning up in all sorts of scientific equations, including those describing the DNA double helix, a rainbow, ripples spreading from where a raindrop fell into water, waves, navigation and more.

ok for my previous post - the essay i dunno the picture i wanted to attach isnt attaching first my comp was not letting me post now its not letting me attach pictures nonetheless. this is another very intresting article i found. it is not my journal entry it is just an intresting article related to the movie what the bleep do we know...

The rationality of science
The image that the scientific community likes to project itself is that of rationality par excellence. The scientific community sees itself as the very paradigm of rationality. It is claimed that the scientific method, provides a logic of justification which enables us to choose between competing theories objectively. This view of science perhaps originated in the recent success of physics. However this model of science has come under attack from philosophers of science, especially Khun and Feyerabend.
Models for the explanation of scientific change ( say from Newtonian mechanics to relativistic mechanics) can be divided into two classes. 1) rational model and 2) non rational model. Scientific endeavor can be rational only if scientific change can be explained rationally. Rationalists ( Popper, Lakatos) disagree among themselves about the goals of science ( explanatory or predictive?) and the principles of comparing theories.
Science will be a rational activity if a theory A is selected or preferred over B, solely for internal reasons- i.e. they relate only to the features of the theories and available evidence. By contrast non rationalists attribute scientific change (or non change) to psychological or sociological factors- factors not related to the theories themselves but to the scientists. These may be their propagandizing abilities or the social or political climate of the time. These explanations would be called external forces. An example of lack of change explained by external factors would be the acceptance of Newtonian Corpuscular theory of light over Young's wave model. Because of the hero worshipping of Newton at that time and due to certain mannerisms of Young and subsequent character assassination of him in Edinburgh Review, the better Young theory was not accepted at that time.
According to Khun and Feyerabend theories are incommensurable (nothing in common). For them the same words in competing theories have different meaning. For Khun the shift in meaning is so extreme that the concepts of one theory cannot be expressed in terms of the concepts of another theory. Fayerabend says that, proponents of incommensurable theories differently constitute the facts. In other words there are no facts independent of theories i.e. facts are theory dependent. This means that two competing theories cannot be rationally compared. If this assertion is true, how do we choose between theories? Is scientific activity and its method irrational?
Meaning of scientific terms
The meaning of a theoretical term in any theory is a function of the role that term plays in the theory. This role is demonstrated by 2 sets of postulates. In one set the term is linked to other theoretical terms in the theory( e'n is negatively charged). In the other set the term is linked to observational terms( e'n will be deflected by a magnetic field). These postulate sets are said to define the meaning of the term electron. Any change in these sets of postulates will ipso facto change the meaning of the theoretical term electron. Some took these meaning postulates to be true analytically. But the extreme positivist position that for any term to have a meaning, the meaning postulate should have a good amount of empirical content, made the scientists to abandon the meaning postulate approach and to replace it with the holistic conception for the meaning of a theoretical term. The meaning of a theoretical term was said to be determined by the entire set of sentences within the theory containing the terms. Hence if Newton and Einstein talk about mass, they will not disagree, but this is not because they agree. They are simply equivocating. On this account, the Newtonian mass is invariant and the relativist mass is not invariant are not logically incompatible as the meaning of mass is not constant across the theories.
This approach to the meaning of a term applies only to theoretical terms, for the observational terms were directly related to experience, and hence their meaning were invariant. Therefore the observational vocabulary is said to be theory free. That is Newton and Einstein could agree or disagree at purely observational level. This means that the 2 theories could be compared at the observational level. Thus if Einstein's theory entails an observation statement O and Newton's theory entailed the negation of O, then the 2 theories are genuinely in conflict.
But there was a complication. Popper, Khun, Feyerabend and others said that " all observation is theory laden". Under this thesis, there is no difference between theoretical terms and observational terms-both are defined in terms of the theory. Under this circumstance Newton and Einstein cannot even compare their observational terms. They mean different things by the term say mass.
Hence under the thesis that when a theory changes, the meaning of all terms changes, 2 theories will always be incommensurable and there cannot be any rational basis for choosing between theories.The realist view of science is that theories are true or false in virtue of how the world is and that the goal of science is to discover explanatory truths about the world. The problem with the above view is that there is a strong inductive evidence for a pessimistic induction, i.e. all physics theories have had their heyday and have been eventually rejected as false. So we can be almost certain that most of the current scientific theories would be discovered to be false say within 200 years. In other words we can never attain absolute truth about the real world. If this is the case then what is the good of science? May be the goal is getting nearer to the truth, i.e. saying that while the current theories are strictly speaking false, but yet we are getting nearer the truth. Popper calls this verisimilitude.
Observation, Theory, and Truth
Theorizing ( Einstein's relativity) leads to general statements and observation ( Eddington photographing field stars in the Hyades group during the solar eclipse of 1919) leads to particular statements. These different type of activities may go on simultaneously.
O/T dichotomy:
It appears that most of the observational statements contain some theoretical terms. For ex. a scientist on seeing a track on a photographic plate exposed in a cloud chamber may report the presence of an electron. But the absence of an O/T dichotomy can be problematical for the progress of science. For if any observational statement presuppose some theory, then how do we get evidence on the basis of observation for any theory? We will be accused of pulling ourselves up with our own theoretical boot straps. According to Newton Smith, there are no purely observational statements. O terms are also theory laden in the sense that no matter how corroborated by many observers, it may be revised by appealing to theory. He says that O, T statements are not different in kind but only in degree. He says that we must have confidence in low level O statements because they have served their purpose well, otherwise we will not be still existing to make judgments. Our confidence in these low level O statements are enough for us to choose between the theories.
Realism Vs Instrumentalism
According to realism scientific propositions are true so long as they correspond with reality. In other words true means true in virtue of how the world is independently of ourselves. For instrumentalists , scientific theories or hypotheses need not be true or even probable, so long as the theory provides a calculus consistent with the observation.( The church was not against Galileo using the heliocentric theory to calculate the orbits of the planets, but did not want him to propound that the heliocentric theory was true, i.e. the earth was really moving around the sun.) For instrumentalists facts are irrelevant- so long as it works.
Instrumentalists assume that theories have the status of instruments or tools or calculating devices in relation to observational statements. "........no question of the truth or reference of the theories themselves arise" (Hesse) The pessimistic induction does not worry an instrumentalist because he does not aim at anything more than an increase in predictive power. But science aim at more than prediction. We also want to explain. For instrumentalists theories are devoid of meaning and hence cannot be used to explain. They regard only singular statements involving only O terms as true or false. Since T terms are devoid of meaning, any sentence containing a T term cannot be true or false. So for an instrumentalist O/T dichotomy exists. If theoretical terms do not exist, then all entities postulated by theories do not exist. This implies that all theories are false. Instrumentalists use logic to predict O statements from theoretical entities. For example, if A and B is true then A is true. How can instrumentalists use standard logic based on the notion of truth preserving rules of inference if they do not attribute any truth value to their premises?
Relativism:
For the relativist, what is true depends on part or entirely on the social perspective of the scientist or on the theory. Accordingly, as time passes, or as society changes or from theory to theory what is true changes and not merely what is taken to be true. Is it possible that sentence "S" is true in @ and false in #. For ex. the earth was flat was true say 1000 years ago (@) and false now (#). This is not possible because the truth conditions for both statements should be the same- i.e. the conditions under which the proposition "earth is flat" should be the same as the conditions under which the proposition " earth is not flat" are true. To specify the truth conditions for a statement is to state what will make it true and what will make it false. If the truth conditions differ, then they are saying different things and hence they do not express the same proposition. Therefore a proposition p contained in a statement A in @ and by a statement B in # cannot be true in one case and false in another, provided the truth conditions are the same. For ex. if a sentence A in my language translates a sentence B in another language, I cannot accept that, these two sentences A and B differ in truth value unless I doubt the translation.
But we can certainly find cases where a sentence S of @ is translated into B of # (our language) and we are absolutely certain that B is true but speakers of @ claim that S is false. Given that the translation is correct then either they (@) are correct or we are correct. We cannot conclude under these circumstance that what is false for them is true for us. We can only say that we differ as to what is true. If this situation is widespread (specially about a lot of low level empirical statements) then we have to question the translation schema. This does not mean relativism is true. Surely many of our beliefs have varied from age to age, culture to culture and theory to theory. This cannot make us accept relativism. The fact that we can identify these diversities means we can also identify sameness across these boundaries i.e. sameness of truth conditions across these perspectives. Therefore the acknowledgment of this plurality of diverse belief systems across different perspectives means the acceptance of the invariance of truth across these perspectives.
Realism and Ontology:
According to realists, a theory must have an associated model in reality. But there are theories such as quantum mechanics and relativity which do not fit this picture. In these theories mathematical models have replaced descriptions of physical reality. How then can realists claim that a statement is true or false in virtue of how the world is? How will he know the reality if it is modeled mathematically, which is abstract? There is no reason to think that unfamiliar theoretical concepts should have an analogy with familiar objects. For there is no reason to think a priori that the unfamiliar must be like the familiar. Items at the subatomic level is a clear example of this class. Hence it may not always be possible to give a realist construction to all theories. (quantum mechanics is one example) Theories which have a realist construction are nice and easy to teach, but we must remember that it is not possible to have such theories in all domains of investigations. All we can say is that evidence of truth (or approximate truth) is evidence of whatever has to exist for the theory to be true. (not an analogical requirement that fits reality)
Popper: The falsificationist:
Truth is the aim of science for Popper. But we do not have any criterion for truth and hence we will never know when we have reached truth. Popper also is not prepared to accept the truth of most low level observational reports. He rejects the use of all inductive argumentation in the pursuit of truth. A scientist who has shown that when 1000 randomly selected sodium samples will give a yellow flame, he has no business to claim that the hypothesis that " a sodium salt will turn a flame yellow" is probably true. For him only deductive argument is permissible. So if just one piece of sodium salt fails to turn the flame yellow, Popper will throw out or reject the sodium hypothesis. The method of science according to Popper is not evidence gathering but rejection and falsification. This inability to attain truth leads Popper to the attainment of better approximation to truth or higher degree of verisimilitude. But as we shall see there are problems with Popper's concept of verisimilitude. How can he choose or what criteria would he use to choose a theory with a higher verisimilitude? Popper claims that a theory that is more corroborated will have higher verisimilitude. But to prove the above thesis we need inductive argument. But Popper has rejected all inductive arguments. Hence he has no basis to correlate corroboration with verisimilitude. What of his refutation? we will see that this is not how progress in science is accounted for. Refutation and rejection of a hypothesis is not the regular practice in a scientific community.
Popper's aim in science is the discovery of explanatory truths. He is also committed to the concept of verisimilitude according to which the history of a mature science is made up of a sequence of theories which are getting nearer to truth. But Popper repeatedly declares that there is no criterion of truth. We may posses true theories but we are unable to show that they are true. This means that there is no finite procedure which we could follow that would provide us with certain knowledge of the truth of a scientific theory. Popper's denial of a criterion of truth depends on his attack on O/T dichotomy. For him all observation is theory dependent. Hence he cannot believe in the truth of the statements the positivists would call observational. For him even a statement like "here is a glass of water" cannot be verified by any observational experience. In accepting this observational statement we are implicitly assuming some theory. On the other hand Popper wants us to accept what he calls basic statements. There are existential statements such as "there is a raven in that tree". Only theories that would negate a basic statement are scientific according to Popper.
We should examine why Popper rejects instances of generalizations(particular O statements) as providing positive evidence for these generalizations.
According to Bayer's formula where is the probability of the generalization g being true given evidence e and is the probability of e given g. Given that the evidence is an instance of generalization, = 1 and assuming that we are absolutely confident of the truth of e, . Therefore since we have , we have .
Hence no matter how many instances of generalizations we observe the probability of the generalization will remain where we started namely zero. Popper to overcome this difficulty completely rejects the inductive evidence and adopts a deductive strategy for scientific methodology. We have noted Popper's correct rejection of the view that observations could provide a criterion of truth and we have also seen his reasons for rejecting this view. Popper's central thesis is his assumption that a) David Hume has shown that no inductive argument is ever acceptable and that it is impossible to justify a law by observation or experiment since a universal law transcends experience and b) the principle of empiricism which asserts that in science only observation and experiments may decide upon the acceptance or rejection of scientific statements. Does not the views a) and b) clash with each other? No says Popper, because a law or theory is only accepted tentatively and so long as a theory stands up to the severest tests it is accepted and if it does not it is rejected. It is never inferred from empirical evidence. How correct or rational is this argument?
If all inductive arguments are precluded what is the method of science? According to Popper science progresses by bold conjectures and eliminating the false ones by rejecting them using empirical or experimental evidence. But is this the methodology of science? Lakatos once asked "do you know a scientist who wants to falsify his theory?" Popper's goal is truth, but he does not define the content of truth. He does not accept empirical evidence as evidence for truth. How then can we rationally pursue this goal (truth) when we have no criteria for recognizing that goal? Popper tries to overcome this problem by revising his goal. The goal is not truth itself but increasing verisimilitude. It means given a pair of rival theories, we ought to adopt the one that is nearer to truth than the other. But then how do we determine this?
The number of assertions of any theory is infinite. Also it will contain an infinite number of true premises and an infinite number of false assertions. Hence we cannot choose between theories (depending on greater verisimilitude) in terms of the number of truths and the number of falsehoods generated by the theory. What then is the rational guide in making judgments of verisimilitude? Popper says that we are to be guided by the degree of corroboration of a theory, where corroboration is "a concise report .......with respect to the way it solves its problems, its degree of testability, the severity of the tests it had undergone, and the way it had stood up to these tests." But for Popper corroboration is not forward looking, "Obviously the degree of corroboration at the time t ....says nothing about the future- for example about the degree of corroboration at a time later than t." Suppose there are two theories A and B and a test falsifies A and not B and if this test is the only test to date, does it mean that A has less verisimilitude than B? Popper does not give a positive answer and so within the Popperian framework corroboration is no indication of verisimilitude.
So far we have seen that in a Popperian deductivist falsification framework there is no correlation between corroboration and verisimilitude. Secondly , the Popperian view of science depends on basic statements, the acceptance of which cannot be rationally justified and thirdly the rejection of a theory because it is in conflict with a basic statement is not the actual practice of the scientific community
On the question of theories with greater verisimilitude, we may increase verisimilitude if the increase in truth content is not offset by an increase in falsity content. We subject the new stronger theory to tests, if we fail to refute it, or if a refutation of the new theory is also a refutation of the old theory, we conjecture says Popper that the new theory has a greater verisimilitude than the older one. This is a correct conclusion, but Popper cannot use this argument as it is a strong inductive argument. That is after sometime we conduct say 100 appropriately designed tests, all of which the theory has passed, we infer inductively that it is likely that the theory will pass other tests too. Popper is arguing an inductive correlation between corroboration and greater verisimilitude which runs like this:
1. Current theories have more verisimilitude than previous theories. (inductive)
2. Current theories have greater degree of corroboration than previous theories.
3. Thus corroboration is a sign of verisimilitude.
Accepting the above argument means accepting induction in the scientific method, the rejection of which is unique in Popper's methodology. Hence Popper the rejecter of inductivism cannot prove his point without using inductive arguments.
For Popper a theory is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable. That means it must entail some basic statement which could turn out to be false, thus falsifying the theory. The question is do theories entail basic statements? The answer is no. In order to derive a testable prediction from a theory we need to specify initial conditions together with a host of auxiliary hypothesis. Suppose we predict that P = ma for certain initial conditions and we did not get the predicted result, have we falsified the theory P = ma ? Certainly not. We have an anomaly ( to use Khun's term). We might have used defective measuring instruments, may be the initial conditions were not correctly specified or some extraneous factors might have intervened. Whatever it is we cannot conclude without further ado that our theory is false. It will be very difficult to falsify a theory that has something going for it. The discovery of a falsity content is not sufficient ground for rejecting a theory, as Feyerabend says "all theories are born falsified".
According to Popper criteria of refutation has to be laid down before hand. Will scientists ever lay down in advance what would lead them to reject or abandon their theories? Do physicists ever lay down conditions for rejecting quantum mechanics? As far as we know this is never done. The question whether to reject a theory in the face of an anomaly has to be decided on the basis of the availability of an alternate theory and on the basis of positive evidence for the theory in question. Hence to stress the goal of attempted refutation as strongly as Popper does is to give a distorted picture of science and in fact fails to fit the actual practice in science. Not withstanding these failures we have to give credit to Popper for his important insight that the goal of science is to increase verisimilitude.
Khun and the image of science:
According to Khun, between the ideology of science and the realities of scientific practice there falls a vast shadow. Khun denies that there is any ideal way with which actual practice could be compared. Khun explains his model in terms of his notion of a paradigm. Critics have accused that Khun uses this word so loosely that it nullifies his work. One critic claims 22 different meanings of the word paradigm in Khun's book " The structure of Scientific Revolution". By the word paradigm Khun means the common factors which are shared by a group of scientists who are working on a common subject. There are:
1) The basic theoretical assumptions held in common which are deployed without question. For ex. nuclear physicists might accept the quantum theory without question.
2) Agreement on models and analogies which might guide them in their research. For ex. treating heat as molecular motion.
3) Agreement on what constitutes a nice problem and what constitutes its solution, and consensus on the significant unsolved problems in a particular field.
The above notions are included in the word paradigm which Khun now prefers to call disciplinary matrix. A paradigm directs our attention not only to the theory but also to the wider range of beliefs, attitudes and procedures of the scientific community.
Normal science and Scientific revolutions:
A period of time during which a particular scientific community shares a paradigm is called normal science by Khun. During this time the community devotes its time to solving puzzles defined by this paradigm. During this time the faith in the accepted theories are so strong that anomalies are not treated as refutation but as problems to be solved. If a theory fails a test it is the scientist who is at fault not the theory. Just like a student in a lab test, when he gets a contradictory result, it is either his equipment or his readings that are at fault, not the theory. In time there may be many unsolved puzzles and working within a paradigm might be a constrain. When this happens alternative theoretical postulates might be articulated. Khun calls this scientific revolution during which time competing paradigms face each other and scientists are left without any principles to choose between them. Khun says that " as in political revolution, so in paradigm choice - there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community". This assent according to Khun is obtained by the propagandizing ability of the proponents of the rival paradigm. For according to him the " normal scientific paradigm that emerges from a scientific revolutions is not only incompatible but often incommensurable with that which has gone before".
Khun therefore presents an irrational picture of scientific progress where theory selection is explained by external forces such as propaganda, as competing theories are incommensurable. Khun gives Newtonian and Relativistic mechanics as examples of incommensurable theories. He likens the transition between paradigms to a religious conversion or a gestalt shift rather than to a rule governed investigation which justifies one paradigm against the other. Scientists decide which is a better theory by learning the tricks of the trade of the scientific fraternity. This view emerges from Khun's skepticism about induction, i. e we cannot accept an empirical claim as true evidence about the world. Regarding the selection of theories Khun remarks that " what better criterion than the decision of the scientific group could there be?" As his critics point out this seems to make theory choice a matter of mob psychology.

Paradigm shift and change in world view:
Khun argues that transition from one paradigm to another involves a change in world view. He says that scientists with a new paradigm sees differently from the way he had seen before. If Khun means by this, just a change in our basic beliefs / or attitudes, then it is trivial. For example when we adopt quantum mechanics, the belief in determinism has to be abandoned. But Khun means more than this. For him a paradigm shift may influence not only how we describe what we see, but will also bring about change in the objects we see. Such a radical change in view is not substantiated by our experience. For example, we studied Newtonian mechanics in school and when we adopt to the Relativistic mechanics, we do not alter our concept of reality or the world radically. The analogy of duck- rabbit given by Khun is too far fetched. He says that you can see only the duck or the rabbit but cannot see both simultaneously. What he wants us to believe by this analogy is that the two theories are incommensurable and depict different world views.
Do paradigm changes, change the way we look at the world, or does it bring about changes in the world itself? Khun says that " practicing in different worlds the two group of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction." Does this mean that the contents of the world change at the behest of our theories? Again quoting Khun: " This is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are looking at the world and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas they see different things and they see them in different relations one to the other." This means that Khun is just saying what is obvious, that any theory change will make us look at different aspects of the world. The world itself does not change in response to the theoretical changes.
From Khun's writing it is clear that he is not a realist. He says that we need not assume the existence of an objective true account of nature to explain the success of science. There are no theory independent ways to describe reality. The notion of a match between the ontology of the theory and its real counterpart in nature is an illusion for Khan. Finally Khun behaves as a non rationalist when he says that his five values guide theory choice but these values cannot be justified. Later he says that these 5 values can be justified as the criteria to be used in achieving progress in science which is a rationalist behavior. Confused? Yes we are. Whatever Khun may be he is not a realist. For him progress in science is not related to truth or verisimilitude but to increase in problem solving ability- an instrumentalist perhaps!
Feyerabend, Against method:
According to Feyerabend there is no such thing as the scientific method. Science is just one tradition. The other traditions, he wants to see given equal treatment are astrology, traditional medicine and even witchcraft. He wants science to be removed from its privileged position in order to create a society in which all traditions are given equal access to power and education.
Most of the philosophers of science would agree that scientific discovery is a lawless province of intuition, inspiration, luck or unlucky hunches and guess work, but justification of scientific theories and theory selection is a legitimate rational and objective activity. But Feyerabend denies that there is a distinction between the discovery of scientific theories and their justification. In fact he denies that there is something called the scientific method.
He denies that there are rules which guide scientists in theory selection and says that adopting such rules and methodology would only impede scientific progress. In this respect Feyerabend is more radical than Khun, for Khun holds the view that there are rules commonly held by the scientific community (though unjustified), even though its application is problematic. Feyerabend rejects such attempts to compare theories objectively in terms of its content or verisimilitude on the grounds that opposing theories are incommensurable. He believes that scientific change can only be explained in terms of subjective preferences, propaganda, political beliefs etc.
Feyerabend’s attack on method is mainly based on the fact that throughout the history of scientific development, such methods or rules have been violated with impunity.
“The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a single rule however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or other. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events, they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of inattention which might have been avoided.
Feyerabend hopes to undermine the rationalist’s faith in all rules of evidence by showing that any such rule has an equally plausible counter-rule the use of which would give opposite results. The first rule he considers is the consistency condition “which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories”. According to Feyerabend we should proliferate theories at odds with accepted theories in order to improve our chances of discovering facts relevant to assessing the acceptability of the original theories: “variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge”. This is similar to Mill’s argument for freedom of opinion. Since we are infallible we should recognize that theories incompatible with our currently accepted theory may be true and consequently we should permit other theories to flourish. Even if our current theory is true, proliferation of rivals should be permitted and indeed encouraged. For we shall not fully appreciate the grounds in favor of our own theory unless we are forced to deal with objections to it. Mill also noted that a theory incompatible with our current theory while in error may contain “a portion of truth”, and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collection of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Feyerabend has contended that he has not shown that proliferation should be encouraged but only that the rationalist cannot exclude it.
No doubt in the long run scientific progress requires that the scientific community contain some lunatics who receive some support. But can science flourish if every one was all the time trying to develop his own totally unique theory.
Inductive reasoning is such that something can be a good supporting reason for a hypotheses even though that hypotheses tuns out to be wrong. Thus it cannot count against a particular inductive rule that it has on some occasion led us to hold false beliefs. To abandon such inductive rule, it should have led us wrong more often than right. The way Feyerabend regards counter examples to a principle of comparison, indicates that he erroneously assumes that the rationalist is committed to believing in exceptions algorithmic principles of comparison. Of course there cannot be such an algorithm in science.
Even Feyerabend claims that he has no knowledge of what is good and bad in science. His theses is that anarchism helps to achieve progress in any of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed only if anarchist moves are occasionally allowed to take place.
Feyerabend castigates the idea that there are objective facts to which we have access through observation and experiment.
“It is this historico-physiological character of evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses some subjective, mythical and long forgotten views concerning the state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology......A straight forward and unqualified judgment of theories by “facts” is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the frame work of some older cosmology.”
Here Feyerabend is rejecting the idea that experience provides unproblematic evidence for the assessment of theories. For him the development of theories incompatible with our considered judgments about the observational facts will assist us in helping to improve those judgments through exposing untenable assumptions which may be implicit in these judgments.
Feyerabend like Khun believes in the incommensurability of competing theories. In such cases none of the so called rational methods, scientists use can be applied.
“We have a point of view (theory, framework, cosmos, mode of representation) whose elements (concepts ,facts, pictures) are built up in accordance with certain principles of construction....Let us call such principles universal principles of the theory in question. Suspending universal principles means suspending all facts and all concepts. Finally let us call a discovery, or a statement, or an attitude incommensurable with cosmos (theory) if it suspends some of its universal principles.
For example Newtonian mechanics is incommensurable with relativistic mechanics.
Finally for Feyerabend, science is but one ideology among many. The only constrain he advocates for an ideology is that it should be coherent.
“There is only one task we can legitimately demand of a theory, and it is that it should give us a correct account of the world, ie. of the totality of facts as constituted by its own basic concepts.”
Feyerabend thinks that we are attaching too much priority to science. He says that “the apostles of science were the more determined conquerors” and that they “materially suppressed the bearers of alternative cultures”.
• Popper's aim in science is the discovery of explanatory truths.
• He rejects the use of all inductive argumentation in the pursuit of truth.
• For him only deductive argument is permissible.
• The method of science according to Popper is not evidence gathering but rejection and falsification.
• Only theories that would negate a basic statement are scientific according to Popper.
• For Popper the goal is not truth itself but increasing verisimilitude.
• For Popper a theory is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable.
• We have to give credit to Popper for his important insight that the goal of science is to increase verisimilitude.
• According to Khun a paradigm or diciplinary matrix directs our attention not only to the theory but also to the wider range of beliefs, attitudes and procedures of the scientific community.
• A period of time during which a particular scientific community shares a paradigm is called normal science by Khun.
• According to Khun the " normal scientific paradigm that emerges from a scientific revolutions is not only incompatible but often incommensurable with that which has gone before".
• He likens the transition between paradigms to a religious conversion or a gestalt shift.
• For him a paradigm shift may influence not only how we describe what we see, but will also bring about change in the objects we see.
• Feyerabend denies that there is a distinction between the discovery of scientific theories and their justification. In fact he denies that there is something called the scientific method.
• He believes that scientific change can only be explained in terms of subjective preferences, propaganda, political beliefs etc.
• Feyerabend castigates the idea that there are objective facts to which we have access through observation and experiment.

Reference: Rationality of Science-Newton Smith

ESSAY

When mathematicians, historians, and scientists say that they have explained something, are they using the word ‘explain’ in the same way?

A different approach to the topic -
What were the conclusions some of my fellow classmates came to?

“When historians explain something they mean something totally different from when mathematicians and scientists explain something.” – Natasha

“Thus different areas of knowledge are explained in different manners and each of these explanations has different implications.” – Kirtika

“History, Math and Science hence explain different things and in different ways.” - Aneesha

“However, when different people- mathematicians, scientists or even historians say they “explain” something are they referring to “explain” in the same way? Truly, looking at all the different meanings of the word, they don’t.” – Raghav

Everybody till now has agreed that when mathematicians, historians and scientists say they have explained something they are using the word explain in different ways. However I beg to differ.

As you must have noticed the main aspect of the title largely deals with the treatment of the word ‘explain’ in a wide variety of contexts. It is reasonable to consider that mathematicians, historians, and scientists would all explain their findings in their own way. However, their actions in essence are the same.

Why is this? All humans are constantly trying to explain the unexplained. They are providing reasons and judgments on the basis of data that they have collected and are presenting their conclusions to describe a phenomenon, idea or concept in their field. Therefore, we can conclude that the explainers themselves are all using the word ‘explain’ in the same way as they are all undergoing the same duty. It is only the listeners that truly distinguish the differences in these ‘explanations.’ The perception of listeners is directly related to ‘Areas of Knowledge’ in the specific field mentioned. Moreover, the ‘Ways of Knowing’ that are employed in each Area. Therefore, at one angle, the question above has an answer that is almost obvious- Explainers would of course be using the word ‘explain’ in the same way, but the connotations of their explanations evoke contrasting sentiments amidst us.

Mathematics is one such area that builds itself on ‘Logic and Reasoning’ that is to say it draws all its explanations in a very logical and rigid fashion. Through my experiences in math, and after discussing how tangible math is with various teachers of the IB, I have realized that Mathematics relies on its own rigid rules that cannot be altered to suit one’s interests.

Due to this very reason, I deem that this ebbs the possibility of one’s own interpretations and perceptions becoming occupied in the process and thus presents knowledge in its most factual form. It is my observation that Mathematics would thus lead to the most logical results that can very rarely, if at all, be debated on. The only possible errors in mathematics could lie in the logic employed.

Shifting to the next area of discussion - History. History seems to be the total opposite of what math is. History is one such Area of Knowledge where explanations are formed entirely on the root of interpretation. As a result this creates a great deal of bias. It has been my personal finding while working on a history project in the 10th grade that I have come across this great deal of bias. I have studied of numerous occurrences during the First World War, where countries like Britain projected that the Germans were wrong (look at cartoon attached), while the German projected that they were not entirely to be blamed for the war.

This was a fine exemplar of a case where many historians distorted facts to suit only one opinion, while disregarding others. This that would most definitely introduce a reasonable degree of doubt regarding the validity of the facts presented. Interpretation clearly allows room for one’s personal opinion, and more often than not, this tends to distort the true facts and the underlying truths.

Looking at the two areas of knowledge presented above, Science would seem to present a very unique perspective, a middle ground between the rigidity of Mathematics and the interpretation of History since it is based purely on experimentation and the evaluation of empirical evidence. Laws can always be modified, and are always open to interpretation. An example of this case is the evolution of science; man himself has progressed from four elements to a hundred and nineteen. Due to this very reason any person who does not trust in the concepts presented to him is able to observe the phenomenon for himself and derive his own independent conclusions out of the calculations he has made.

However, it is important to note that in the above paragraphs, the view of the Areas of Knowledge with respect to the explainers is considered. Although the means by which they arrive at their respective conclusions are completely diverse, the underlying theory is still the same. They are all trying to describe the world around them, and ‘explain’ the occurrences that happen in our world.

Thus, differences in the usage of the word ‘explain’ cannot arise, as it still means the same thing to each explainer. The difference lies in the perceptions of the listeners who retain their own analysis as well as prior knowledge while evaluating an argument and are thus able to generate their own opinions regarding each field. An analysis of these skills does in fact reveal a great deal about the human thought process and how, as individuals, we pick and observe flaws out in others arguments and thus ascertain its level of credibility. A perfect example of this would be quoting my fellow classmates at the beginning of my essay.

All three Areas of Knowledge listed above can be used connected to logic to evaluate an argument also called -Aristotelian ‘logos’. Each Area involves the analysis of data to arrive at some conclusions. Thus, reasoning skills that will be analyzed would keep in mind the ‘logos’ nature of each area and thus assist in the understanding of the leading question. Obviously these areas require certain other skill but the foundation is primarily the same.

Mathematics is often coupled with Inductive Reasoning. In maths we develop our own hypothesis or so called ‘conjectures’ and proceed to verify the observations by the Principle of Mathematical Induction. For example when a mathematician sees a familiar pattern between a certain group of numbers, i.e. when he attempts to generalize a pattern in that group of numbers, he first comes up with a conjecture using Induction. His peers prove his conjecture carefully as goes through a tough check; the statement of his conjecture finally becomes a Theorem when his peers agree and will always remain so. Elevation to the height of a theorem is an irreversible process- the results proved are largely irrefutable at this stage. Due to the logical nature of Mathematics and the rigidity of its founding principles, opponents of math cannot seldom debate on any of the laws established simply because its logical foundations are far too strong. There are no observable degrees of uncertainty and so we tend to treat mathematical knowledge as pure fact.

As for History, it works on causality and effect-to-cause reasoning. Historians seek to describe the past by analyzing its effect on the present. For a historian, the world is a place where every action has a reaction. This would, of course, present readers with a degree of uncertainty. For example when you read a history book written by a Nazi about the holocaust, you are going to get a different view about it than if you read a book written by a Jew. In history there are always two sides to every event, this hinders our knowledge because we don't know which is true, and we can only give our own interpretations and analysis to what we're read - and this depends on our own paradigm and cultural background. Effects discussed may not necessarily have been created by causes outlined by the historians. As said, the world does not function in isolation. When historians explain something, those who are listening to their analysis often note the element of bias within the minds of the historians. Historians can often make several errors in judgment and overlook key fats while backtracking from effect to cause.

Science presents a unique perspective that makes use of several aspects of reasoning employed in both mathematics and history. The basis of science is Conditional Reasoning, or the formation of a hypothesis. This means that while conducting an experiment one must carry it out in ideal conditions. However it is also important to have a independent and a dependant variable. The “If…Then… because…” nature of Conditional Reasoning allows spectators to effectively comprehend the idea being established in the laboratory and question the procedures employed for any flaws. They also note the degree of uncertainty in experimental measurements and are mindful of the errors generated. Science involves both qualitative and quantitative measures. However what may be true for one point of time may not for anther. For example, in the 17th century people did not believe that they could travel from one place to another by flying. Today in the 21st we use aircrafts that transport us in a span of no less than 2 hours from Delhi to Bombay.

This example again explains the point that each Area evokes a dramatically different sentiment within any listener. However, we can conclude that listeners would view Mathematical facts as most logical, and least open to debate, due to its nature of being based on a harsh system of rules. Historical interpretations are always doubted, mainly due to the abundance of errors that are inevitably present in any account. This is the reason why the nature of sources in history is extremely important as it defines the element of bias within the account and allows readers to become aware of the said bias. Lastly, science is a unique blend of both History and Mathematics. Listeners are always allowed to maintain their own opinions but still note the logical framework of scientific reasoning and would thus take scientific explanations to be far more factually accurate than an opinion in History.

Therefore the leading question still remains answered. The connotations of the word ‘explain’ as used in the guiding question differ only from the perspective of the viewer. Explainers are merely carrying out their job of generating generalizations to describe our world.

TOK Essay

When a mathematician, historian and scientist say that they have explained something, do they all use the word ‘explain’ in the same way?

To answer this question, we must first come to the very basis of the question. What exactly are they trying to ‘explain’? A mathematician will try and explain a phenomenon totally different from that of the historian or the scientist. The areas of knowledge which they are trying to interpret have a very different significance in today’s world. Thus when understanding the meaning of what each one has to say, we have to talk about the ways of knowing, which plays a very significant role in what they have ‘explained.’

“You are not thinking. You are merely being logical.”

- Neils Bohr, 1885-1962 to Albert Einstein.

This is the principal a mathematician lives by. Mathematics is all about logic. It has no relation at all with the understanding of the subject. If you can prove something in a logical sequence, using correct mathematical terms, it has been correctly explained. This is what a mathematician does when he ‘explains’ something.

Why does 2 and 2 make 4 and not 3. Why is the integration of sin(x), cos(x) and not tan(x) ? Well, this all seems to be logic as I really don’t understand why this happens, even though it does. If someone tells me he has one $10 bill, and one $20 dollar bill. I know that he has $30 in total. Using my logic I know that to calculate the total amount of money, I simply have to add and not subtract or multiply. I do not need to think what to do.

“All generalizations are false-including this one.”

- Henry David Thoreau, 1817-1862.

This is what a scientist seeks to achieve. In science, something is believed to be true until it is so proved otherwise. Therefore, when a scientist says that he has ‘explained’ something, it means that he has just disproved a previous ‘truth’, and has come up with his own model for explaining the phenomenon which will now be deemed as the truth until disproved again.

The structure of an atom is one such example. With the discovery of the atom, scientists have created a vast number of models to help explain it. Each one different from the other, yet each one was considered as the “truth” by society for a period of time. With the discovery of electrons, Neils Bohr’s newest addition of sub-shells and orbitals has now become the “true” structure of an atom. It will not be long before this will be disproved too. Who knows, it might be one of us who will finally do it.

“What is history but a fable agreed upon.”

- Napoleon Bonaparte, 1769 – 1821

The past can never have concrete evidence, which does not have some fault in it. Everything a historian uses as proof can have another meaning to it. But it is the most agreed upon one which is finally written down in our text books, and termed as “history”. Thus when a vast variety of people believed that something really did happen, it becomes part of our history. A good example of this is that of the legendary King Arthur. When I was a young child I remember my mother would tell me to eat my cereal, even though I hated it as it would make me strong like King Arthur who was the only person who could remove the sword, the Excalibur, from the stone it was wedged in. No historian has yet found any proof of the Knights of the Round Table or of the Excalibur, except for the tales passed down from generation to generation.

Mathematics is oft considered as a language used to convey some message. Just like our English language, mathematics too consists of rules which must be followed for it to make sense. It consists of a large number of terms and symbols like the long list of vocabulary we all see in our SAT books, many of which we have not even heard of and many funny sounding, which makes you think who uses such words. To be clear in mathematics, we must be able to use a vast variety of symbols which to some people will be a simple and logical sequence. For example, when I first studied calculus I was told to find the derivative of (x³ + x² + 99x ). This meant nothing to me and my brain could not process what I was reading. This was not eased when my teacher said that it was really simple, and all we had to do was apply the formula: xⁿ = nx^n-1. But now, after correctly understanding the language, it seems so simple. Thus, for mathematics to be explained, its own language must be used, and for someone to understand this language, just like any other language he must be able to be fluent in it.

Scientists believe that everything has a reason, and nothing in this world can spring up because God wanted it to. There has to be some controlling factor, or some catalyst which caused whatever happened, to happen the way it did. Therefore, when the try to “explain” something, they have to have a fool proof reason for it, and therefore Reason plays an important role for them. In science, both inductive as well as deductive reasoning is used. There are some generalizations which can be applied such as; All halides are coloured. Chlorine is a halide. Therefore chlorine must be coloured. This is true as chlorine is greenish-yellow in colour. An example of inductive reasoning is; Methane has 1 carbon atoms and 4 hydrogen atoms. Ethane has 2 carbon atoms and 6 hydrogen atoms. Propane has 3 carbon atoms and 8 hydrogen atoms. Therefore all alkanes must have the general formula C_nH_2n+2. But scientists are wary of this, as inductive reasoning may not always be very reliable. There are always a few exceptions such as that of Cyclopentane, which even though is an alkane, has the general formula C_nH_2n which is that of an alkene. Thus when explaining something, scientists use the deductive method of reasoning as compared to the inductive.

“It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; What is essential is invisible to the eye.”

- Antoine De Saint-Exupery, 1900-1944.

This is the role perception plays. In history, evidence can never be 100% in the right direction. There are various ways in which it can be interpreted and explained. But perception is mostly affected by our Emotion. When a historian explains something there are various factors which causes him to say what he has. Which side did he originally believe ? If he found some evidence did he consider it or discard it ? Is he dealing with an emotional subject ? An example of this would be in my own country, that of the “Revolt of 1857.” This was the first time in the history of India that we stood up against the British rule, demanding back our sovereignty and integrity. Indians throughout the world regard this as a “Revolt” against the unjust rule of the British imperialists. But the British regard it as a “mutiny” where they were overthrown from their power by the people they ruled over. Indian historians will have a totally different explanation of what happened from British historians. Thus emotion and perception play an important role in the “explanation” of something by a historian.

Thus from the above examples, we can conclude that when a historian, a mathematician and a scientist seek to explain something to us, they are all using the term “explain” in different contexts as they are all trying to explain to us different areas of knowledge, which are related to different ways of knowing. This will affect how they perceive the word “explain.”